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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




BASIL VETAS dba SIR BASIL'S, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 14653 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
S'.rATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit against defendant seeking 
money damages for breach of a written rental agreement re-
lating to custom-made electrical signs manufactured by 
plaintiff for defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, sitting without a jury, rendered 
judgment for plaintiff against defendant in the sum of 
$1,112.54, $500.00 attorney's fees and plaintiff's costs 
cf the action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff asks the Court to affirm the judgment of 
the Trial Court and to award it its costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff agrees in part with the Statement of Facts 
as set forth by defendant but feels several facts have been 
omitted which are material to the issues here raised. Plain-
tiff deems the important facts to be as follows: 
On March 7, 1961, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into a written rental agreement under the terms of which 
plaintiff agreed to manufacture and install a custom-made 
neon sign for defendant's drive-in restaurant located at 
999 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah. (Ex. 8-D). Said agree-
ment required defendant to make monthly rental payments to 
plaintiff at the rate of $110.00 per month. As part of the 
security for the performance by defendant of his obligations 
under the agreement, the sum of $660.00 was deposited with 
plaintiff. Said sum was to be returned to defendant in the 
event he performed all of his obligations under the lease. 
Under the terms of the lease agreement, the title to the 
sign remained in the plaintiff and plaintiff was obligated, 
among other things, to maintain and keep the sign in good 
repair. The sign was duly built and installed by plaintiff 
in 1961. Subsequent thereto, defendant requested additional 
-2-
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signage from plaintiff. Plaintiff and defendant entered into 
a new rental agreement on the 20th day of January, 1963 (Ex. 
9-D) under the terms of which defendant agreed to pay plain-
tiff the sum of $135.00 per month for the rental of the 
combined sign package. The terms and conditions of that 
agreement were similar to the terms and conditions of the 
previous rental agreement. Defendant's security deposit was 
transferred to the new agreement. Pursuant to defendant's 
request and specifications, plaintiff thereafter manufactured 
certain overhanging plexiglas panels and installed the same 
on defendant's premises. 
Subsequent to 1963 the subject signs were damaged 
in a windstorm. Under the maintenance provisions of the con-
tract, plaintiff was required to expend the approximate 
sum of $2,000.00 to repair and restore the damaged signs 
(R-90, 102). 
By November of 1967, defendant's business was not 
doing well. Defendant thereupon contacted Mr. Robert Gilbert, 
manager of plaintiff's Ogden office and requested that some-
thing be done to reduce the monthly sign payments so as to 
increase the cash flow in defendant's business (R-72, 149, 
151). At the time the request was made, defendant was de-
linquent in his payments to plaintiff under the previous 
rental agreewent in the sum of $558.9 2. (Ex. 1-P) • Pursuant 
to the request of defendant, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into a third rental agreement relating to the subject signs, 
(Ex. 2-P), the terms and conditions of which were similar 
-3-
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to the two previous agreements. It is this third rental agree-
ment which forms the basis of the law suit. 
Under the terms of the subject rental agreement, 
1 
defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $99.17 per 
month for each and every calendar month for a period of 96 
months with all rentals to be paid monthly in advance. Pay-
ment was to begin on December 1, 1967 (Finding No. 2, R-57). 
The lease agreement was not only for the use of the signs by 
defendant but also imposed upon plaintiff the burden of up-
keep and maintenance of the signs (Finding No. 6, R-57). 
The contract provided that in the event of any failure of 
the defendant to pay any installment of the rental called 
for at the time provided, plaintiff had the right to term-
inate the agreement and, in addition thereto, to repossess 
the signs (Ex. 2-P) • Defendant agreed to pay a reasonable 
attorney's fee in the event of suit after default (Finding 
No. 2, R-57). On disputed evidence the Court found that the 
defendant's security deposit was applicable to this agree-
ment. 
follows: 
Paragraph 8 of the subject agreement provided as 
" ( 8) It is agreed by the parties hereto 
that the SIGN is of special construction made 
for the uses and purposes of lessee and no 
other, and that except for use by lessee, the 
SIGN has no value. Lessee agrees that in the 
1The price was arrived at by combining the remaining 
balance due under contract #2 with plaintiff's standard 
renewal rate of 60% and extending the payments over 96 months. 
In making the calculations, however, Gilbert by error under-
stated the rentals by some $1,300.00 (R-72-73, 76, 80-81). 
-4-
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event he shall be in default in the payment 
of rental when due or shall fail to perform 
any other of his obligations hereunder, he 
shall be indebted to, and hereby agrees to pay 
to lessor forthwith, in addition to the full 
rental for such time as lessee retains poss-
ession of the SIGN, liquidated damages for 
his breach hereunder in an amount equal to 
three-fourths of the balance of the rental 
payable hereunder, whether the same may be 
due or not. The parties hereto agree that in 
such event, the said three-fourths of the bal-
ance of the rental payable hereunder is and 
will be fair and reasonable compensation for 
the damage to lessor arising from such breach 
by lessee. • • " 
Defendant proceeded to make installment payments 
under the subject contract but experienced some difficulty 
in doing so. In order to help defendant, plaintiff corn-
rnenced purchasing gasoline from him and allowed him a 
credit against his monthly payments for the gasoline pur-
chases (R. 103). In spite of the efforts by plaintiff, de-
fendant became delinquent in his payments to plaintiff ln 
September of 1970 (Ex. 5-D) • 'I'hereafter, defendant made 
2 
sporadic payments and his delinquency gradually increased 
until, as of December 1, 1973, defendant owed plaintiff the 
sum of $691.19 for delinquent rentals (Finding No. 4, R-57, 
Ex. 6-P) • A demand letter was sent to defendant requesting 
that the account be brought current and that upon his failure 
to do so certain legal steps would be initiated by plaintiff. 
On December 26, 1973, defendant made one monthly payment of 
2Paragraph 9 of the contract states, "Time is of the 
essence of this agreement. Acceptance by Lessor of a late 
payment shall not be construed as a waiver of Lessor's right 
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$103.63 (Ex. 5-D, R-113), reducing the delinquent rental 
balance owed to plaintiff at that time to $587.54. No pay-
ments were received by plaintiff from defendant after Decem-
ber 26, 1973 (Finding No. 4, R-57). On February l, 1974, 
suit was commenced by plaintiff against defendant for breach 
of the December 1967 rental agreement. Plaintiff sought all 
sums in arrears plus liquidated damages on the remaining con-
tract balance and attorney's fees. Defendant retained pos-
session of the signs. On June 11, 1974, plaintiff attempted 
to reclaim the signs but defendant refused to allow it to do 
so (R-40). Defendant continued in business on the premises 
until October 15, 1974 (R-152). Since the signs were custom-
made for defendant, plaintiff was unable to negotiate a new 
lease on the signs with subsequent occupants of the premises 
(R-74). In February of 1975 plaintiff removed the signs to 




ON APPEAL, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE PRESUMED 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court 
took the matter under advisement; subsequently it entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R-56-58). The 
Findings of the Trial Court should be dispositive of this 
appeal. Among other things the Court found that: 
l. The deposit of $660.00 was to be returned to 
defendant in the event that defendant performed all of his 
-6-
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obligations under the rental agreement, but that defendant 
failed to so perform (Finding No. 3, R-57). 
2. On December 1, 1973, defendant was in material 
default under the terms of the contract and there was due 
to plaintiff from defendant the sum of $691.17. On December 
26, 1973, plaintiff received from defendant the sum of 
$103.63, which was applied toward the accrued delinquency, 
but no payments were received by plaintiff from defendant 
subsequent to that date (Finding No. 4, R-57). 
3. The signs were unique chattels constructed and 
designed especially for use on the lessee's premises (Finding 
No. 5, R-57). 
4. Plaintiff was not in breach of the terms of the 
agreement with defendant and properly maintained the signs 
and did such other things as it was required to do under 
the rental agreement (Finding No. 8, R-57). 
5. The actual damages caused by the breach of the 
agreement by defendant were difficult to accurately estimate 
at the time the subject lease was executed by the parties 
and the amount stipulated in the lease agreement for liqui-
dated damages bears a reasonable relation to the damages 
actually sustained by plaintiff (Finding No. 9, R-58). 
Upon appeal the evidence must be viewed in a light 
most favorable to sustain the Trial Court. The Findings 
come to this Court endowed with a presumption of validity 
and correctness and will not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly contrary to the evidence; the appellant must sustain 
-7-
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the burden of showing error. Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Ut.2d 
251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972); Lynch v. McDonald, 12 Ut.2d 427, 
367 P.2d 464 (1962); Carlton v. Hackett, 11 Ut.2d 389, 360 
P.2d 176 (1961). 
Plaintiff submits that the Findings of the Trial 
court are adequately supported by the evidence as set forth 
hereafter and must be sustained by this Court on appeal. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS IN MATERIAL DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE CONTRACT AND THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT RELATING 
THERETO MUST BE SUSTAINED. 
The evidence is undisputed that on December 1, 1973, 
defendant was delinquent in his payments to plaintiff in the 
sum of $691.17 (Finding No. 4, R-57, 125, Ex. 1-P), a sum 
in excess of his security deposit. Defendant himself ack-
nowledges this fact (R-148) • 3 Defendant argues, however, 
that he was not in default because a subsequent payment by 
him made his accrued rental delinquency less than the sec-
urity deposit held by plaintiff. 
The rental agreement provided that as part security 
for the performance by lessee of his obligations the sum of 
$660.00 was to be deposited with lessor. The document fur-
ther provided that "in the event lessee shall have performed 
all of his obligations hereunder, such deposit is to be 
3Defendant in his brief 
that at the end of December he 
(Brief of Appellant, page 4). 
-8-
states it is not disputed 
was in arrears five payments 
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returned." (Ex. 2-Pl. The Trial Court found, and properly 
so, that defendant had failed to perform all of his obliga-
tions under the agreement (Finding No. 3, R-57), and, there-
fore, was not entitled to a return of the security deposit. 
The mere fact that the defendant gave plaintiff a 
security deposit does not relieve defendant of his obligation 
to make the monthly payments on the lease as they accrue. 
Barlow v. Hoffman, 103 Colo. 286, 86 P.2d 239 (1938). Under 
the terms of the subject agreemen~ defendant, upon his breach, 
became obligated to plaintiff for the full rentals for such 
time as he retained possession of the sign and, in addition 
thereto, three-fourths of the remaining contract balance 
(Ex. 2-P, Finding No. 2, R-57); therefore, on December 1, 
4 1973, defendant's obligation to plaintiff amounted to $2,401.85, 
a sum greatly in excess of the amount of his security de-
posit. Even if the sums owed by defendant were less than 
his deposit defendant would still be in breach of the agree-
ment. 
Where, as in this case, money is deposited as secur-
ity for the performance of a lease, the lessor is entitled to 
retain the deposit until the lessee has completely discharged 
all of his obligations. Garfinkle v. Montgomery, 248 P.2d 
52 (Cal. App. 1952). As was stated therein: 
4$99.17 x 23 months x 75% = $1,710.68 + $691.17 = 
$2,401.85. If defendant was obligated for the full rentals 
for such time as he retained possession of the sign, as the 
contract provides, defendant's indebtedness would have been 
greater. In calculating the above figure, however, defendant 
was only "charged" for 75% of the remaining contract balance. 
-9-
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"The lessor is entitled to retain the 
deposited fund until complete discharge by 
the lessee of the obligations the perfor-
mance of which the deposit is shown to have 
been intended to secure. " ( Id. at 57) • 
If the lessee fails to perform his obligations, lessor is 
entitled to recover his damages and if actual damages exceed 
the deposit, the entire deposit may be retained and the 
additional damages recovered. If the actual damages are 
less than the deposit, the remaining portion may be reclaimed 
by lessee. 5 Williston, Contracts (3d) ~90, p. 768. See 
also Boral v. Caldwell, 35 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1964). Thus, in 
the instant case, defendant was entitled to a full return 
of the deposit only if he fully performed his obligations; 
otherwise, as the Trial Court found, plaintiff was entitled 
to apply the deposit against its damages. 
Since a security deposit must be returned to the 
extent that it exceeds the actual damages incurred, it 
follows inescapably that one can be in default under a con-
tract although the amount of the default is less than the 
deposit. See Garfinkle v. Montgomery, supra. 
In the instant case defendant had few obligations 
other than to make his monthly payments. This defendant 
failed to do. Defendant's failure to pay the accrueing in-
stallments when due placed him in breach of his contractual 
obligations with pl~intiff. 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts, §429. 
The subsequent payment of one month's accrued delinquency 
cannot excuse defendant's breach. 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although defendant had no right to require plaintiff 
to utilize the deposit to off-set his accrued delinquen~J, 
it is interesting to note that he made no request of plain-
tiff ~~at the deposit be so applied (R-152), even though he 
had received repeated demands that he bring his account 
current (R-152). Defendant should not now be heard to com-
plain that plaintiff's failure to do that which it was not 
required to do ~~d that which defendant had not even re-
quested i-:: :io shoc:ld absolve defendant from the consequences 
of his cwn actions. 
As of December of 1963 ~~ere remained 23 months of 
the contract at ~~e ~n~~ly payment of $99.17 plus sales tax 
for a re~ining balance due under the contract of S2,2B0.9l 
(R-113). 3y ::'ebr·.1ary 1, 1974, the date suit was i:-.st.:.-:,.:-:ed, 
the nini=·-= accr'.led rental delinquency was $736.30 ($69l.i7 + 
(99.17 x 2 x 75~] - 103.63). Subsequent to December 26, 1973, 
defendan~ =ade no f'.lr~her payments on the sign although he 
retained i~s ·..:se and ;:as session until October of 1974, at 
whic~ ~e ~e ceased doing business (R-152). In spite of 
~'1e :ac~ ~.a-:. defe:-.dant continued to use the sign and paid 
no f·..:r-:...'".er re:-.-:.a:..s c:: i~, he ·.vould now like this Court to 
give ~ -:...':e ::;~-:.:.:::::-., a-:. :-.:.s sole discretion, of applying his 
sec;;.r::'.-:.~· de~cs:.-:. a-:. a:-.~- sta;e of the agreement as he, in 
retrcscec-:. sees ___ , -~ cff-set the accrued rental obliga-
tic:-.s. ::-.is :-.e a5:-:5, :.:-. s:;i te of the fact that he never re-
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In the instant case there was a dispute in the test-
imony concerning the disposition of the security deposit. 
The Trial Court found in favor of the defendant on that 
point and allowed defendant to credit the security deposit 
against the judgment. The plaintiff testified that a journal 
entry was made regarding the deposit in order to partially 
correct the mistake that had been made in the calculation of 
the subject contract (R-122-123). Mr. Gilbert, testified 
that the transfer was made after consultation with defendant 
(R-86). The defendant denied that he had ever been so in-
formed by plaintiff. Plaintiff's records were in a state of 
disarray due to the transfer of its bookkeeping functions 
from Ogden to Salt Lake City. The Court held there was 
insufficient evidence for it to determine precisely what had 
happened to the deposit. 
Defendant now attempts to have its cake and eat it 
too with regards to the security deposit. Defendant was 
more than agreeable to off-set the deposit against the judg-
ment awarded to plaintiff and yet now argues that the deposit 
had, in fact, been previously appropriated by plaintiff. 
The only manner in which it could have been utilized was to 
partially off-set the contract miscalculation (R-82, 121, 
136). Plaintiff submits that if the deposit had, in fact, 
been utilized by it as its witnesses indicated, no off-set 
should be credited against the judgment since the "deposit" 
would be non-existent. If, however, as the Court found, a 
credit against the judgment is proper, there can be no claim 
-12-
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that the security deposit had been appropriated by plain-
ntiff. The Court found on disputed testimony that it could 
not determine the disposition of the deposit, therefore 
defendant was entitled to have the deposit applied towards 
the obligation owed to plaintiff. Although plaintiff con-
tends that there is evidence to support a contrary conclu-
sion, it must abide by the findings of the court. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT IN BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT. 
Defendant claims that plaintiff actually breached 
the terms of the contract since it failed to maintain the 
subject sign after December 1, 1973 (Appellant's Brief, 
page 6). Although there was some dispute in the testimony 
concerning the maintenance of the signs; the Trial Court 
found that plaintiff had not breached the terms of its 
agreement, and further found that plaintiff had properly 
maintained the signs and did such other things as it was 
required to do under the terms of the rental agreement 
(Finding No. 8, R-57). 
Mr. Garth Hess, the service manager for plaintiff, 
testified that defendant's signs were included upon a nightly 
sign patrol (R-100), and Lhat the signs were properly main-
tained (R-101, 104-105). Mr. Hess further stated that he 
didn't remember receiving any complaints from the defendant 
5It is the duty of the Trial Court to resolve any con-
flicts in the testimony. McKaren v. Merrill, 15 Ut.2d 179, 
389 P.2d 732 (1964). 
-13-
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regarding the maintenance on the signs (R-102, 103), although 
he saw the defendant frequently (R-103-104). When the signs 
were removed he had occasion to review their condition and 
found that there was nothing wrong with them (R-104). In 
support of his contention that plaintiff had not maintained 
the signs, the defendant testified that subsequent to the 
time that suit was initiated by plaintiff, the signs "didn't 
light up." Defendant estimated that this occurred possibly 
in March or April of 1974 (R-147). Defendant further in-
dicated that there was some paint peeling on the bottom of 
the panel. All of defendant's complaints regarding the 
condition of the signs, however, relate to conditions that 
occurred subsequent to the time defendant breached the rental 
agreement and at a time when defendant's accrued monthly 
delinquency was, at a minimum, in excess of $800.00. The 
lessee's material breach in failing to pay his rental obliga-
tions excused plaintiff from further performance under the 
contract. See Young Electric Sign Co. v. Fohrman, 466 
P.2d 846 (Nev. 1970): Restatement of Contracts, §397 (1932). 
Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff, upon 
defendant's default, had the right to immediately repossess 
the signs and, in addition, to collect liquidated damages 
for the remainder of the contract term. The subsequent 
failure of the signs to properly function cannot be considered 
a breach of the contract since, by its terms, plaintiff 
could have completely removed the signs from defendant's 
premises prior to the time they ceased to function properly. 
-14-
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C£ Young Electric Sign Co. v Fehrman, supra. In the in-
stant case, defendant at least had the use of the signs during 
the day, whereas, had plaintiff exercised its rights under 
the contract and repossessed the signs, defendant would not 
have had any use of the signs. 
It is interesting to note that plaintiff attempted 
to repossess the signs on June 11, 1974, but that defendant 
refused to allow plaintiff to do so (R-40). Defendant, at 
that time, maintained that the signs were still of some value 
to him since he was still operating his business at that 
location (R-43). Defendant refused to pay plaintiff the 
sums due under the rental agreement, refused to allow plain-
tiff to repossess the signs, and continued to have the use 
of the signs at his business. Although defendant would not 
pay the rentals on them, he felt that the signs still had some 
value to him, but now asks this Court to find that in spite 
of these failures to pay the rent when due, plaintiff never-
theless had a duty to continue to maintain the signs and to 
incur additional expenses relating to them without a cor-
responding obligation on the part of defendant to 'nake the 
monthly payments. such a contention is contrary to the de-
cided law on this point. Young Electric Sign Co. v. Fehrman, 
supra. 
The evidence is clear; plaintiff performed its duty 
and defendant breached his. The findings of the Trial Court 
are amply supported by the evidence. 
-15-
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Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IS 
REASONABLE AND MUST BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT. 
As previously set forth, the rental agreement pro-
vided for liquidated damages upon defendant's breach equal 
to three-fourths of the remaining contract balance. The 
law of this state is to the effect that where the parties to 
a contract stipulate to the amount of liquidated damages 
that will be paid in case of a breach, such a stipulation is 
generally enforceable. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Ut. 468, 243 
P.2d 446 (1952). In the instant case defendant had entered 
into three agreements with plaintiff relating to the signs 
each of which contained an identical provision calling for 
liquidated damages in the event of defendant's breach (Ex. 
2-P, 8-D, 9-D). Since the Trial Court adopted the measure 
of damages defendant had agreed to, defendant should not 
now be heard to complain. See Ray v. Electrical Products 
Consolidated, 390 P.2d 607 (Wyo. 1964). 
A large portion of the electrical signs in the 
industry are custom-made and maintenance is often included 
in the lease thereof, thereby making an accurate forecast of 
actual damages difficult. As a consequence, a provision for 
liquidated damages is common in rental agreements in the 
sign industry. These provisions have generally been upheld 
by the courts. See Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, 94 Id. 
518, 492 P.2d 57 (1971) and Young Electric Sign Co. v. 
Fohrman, supra, upholding identical provisions to the one 
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here in question, Ray v. Electrical Products Consolidated, 
supra, 75% clause upheld; Mosier v. Woodell, 189 Wash. 583, 
66 P.2d 353 (1937), 80% clause upheld; Bassett v. Claude 
Neon Federal Co., 65 F. 2d 526 (lOth Cir. 1933), 75% clause 
upheld; Lamson Co. v. Elliott-Taylor-Woolfenden Co., 25 
F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1928), 80% clause upheld. 
Defendant states, and plaintiff agrees, that an award 
of liquidated damages must fit within the requirements of 
Section 339, Restatement of Law of contracts. That section 
provides: 
"[A)n agreement made in advance of breach, 
fixing the damages therefor, is not enforce-
able as a contract and does not affect the 
damages recoverable for the breach unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable 
forecast of the harm that is caused by the 
breach and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach 
is one that is incapable or very difficult of 
accurate estimation." Restatement of Contracts, 
§339 (1932). 
In the instant case, the Court specifically found 
that the actual damages caused by a breach of the agreement 
by defendant were difficult to actually estimate at the time 
the subject lease was executed by the parties (Finding No. 
9, R-58). Plaintiff submits that there is ample evidence to 
support this conclusion. The evidence showed that the signs 
were custom-made neon signs constructed and designed espec-
ially for use on the lessee's premises (Finding No. 5, 
R-57). The rental agreement provided that "it is agreed by 
the partj es hereto that the sign is of special construction 
made for ·the uses and purposes of Lessee and no other, and 
-17-
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that except for use by Lessee the sign has no value. " 
(Paragraph 8 of Ex. 2-P) • Mr. Robert Gilbert testified that 
plaintiff attempted to mitigate its damages by dealing with 
several other parties relating to the signs, but that the 
signs could not be used by subsequent tenants of the prem-
ises because they were custom-built for defendant (R-141). 
Plaintiff ultimately removed the signs to its junkyard (R-
78). When removal of the signs was sought by plaintiff, 
defendant took the position that the signs were of "some 
value" to him, but that they had no value to plaintiff (R-
43). When dealing with this precise issue and the precise 
contract presented here, the Supreme Court of Idaho, in 
resolving the question in favor of plaintiff, stated: 
"Since the value of signs themselves is 
questionable, it follows that computation of 
the actual damages to Young Electric is 'in 
capable or very difficult of accurate estima-
tion'." Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, 
supra. 
There is, however, additional evidence to support the 
Trial Court's Finding. The subject rental agreement was not 
only for the use of the signs by defendant but also imposed 
upon plaintiff the burden of upkeep and maintenance (Finding 
No. 6, R-57). A portion of the compensation plaintiff was 
to receive from defendant under the rental agreement was 
for services as well as for the use of the signs. Testimony 
indicated that prior to the execution of the subject con-
tract the signs had been severely damaged in a windstorm and 
that Young Electric, under its duty to maintain the signs, 
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had, on that occasion, expended the approximate sum of 
$2,000.00 in repairing a portion of the subject signs (R-90, 
102). Other than the windstorm, however, the signs, through 
their life, had required only standard maintenance (R-107). 
Robert Krantz, the credit manager for plaintiff, testified 
that during the year 1973 plaintiff had only been required 
to expend the sum of $175.00 for the maintenance of the signs 
(R-128, Ex. 7-P). It is obvious that plaintiff could not 
look into the future and could not determine in advance 
whether the signs would be damaged by wind, vandalism or any 
other cause, or whether the signs would weather properly or 
require a large amount of painting or other maintenance. Thus, 
it is clear that the actual damages caused by breach of the 
agreement were sufficiently difficult to ascertain at 
the time the contract was signed. The testimony is uncon-
troverted in this respect and the Trial Court specifically 
so found (Find1ng No. 9, R-58). 
Since the damages were sufficiently difficult to 
estimate at the time the contract was entered into, the only 
remaining impediment to plaintiff's award of liquidated 
damages is the question of whether they bear a reasonable 
relation to the damages actually sustained. In this regard, 
the Trial Court made a specific finding that the amount 
stipulated in the lease for liquidated damages did bear a 
reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained by the 
plaintiff (Finding No. 9, R-58). 
-19-
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In attempting to attack the Court's specific finding, 
defendant has misconstrued the evidence that was presented. 
Defendant here contends that the maintenance cost of the 
sign amounted to $50.00 per month and that taxes and insur-
ance each amounted to an additional $15.00 per month. Such 
a contention is clearly erroneous. The testimony is undis-
puted that the figures relied upon by defendant were rule-
of-thumb estimates used by plaintiff to allocate the charges 
made to defendant and were not the actual expenses incurred 
6 
by Young Electric (R-96, 129). The figures were, in fact, 
arrived at subsequent to the date the contract was executed 
(R-96, 139) and were not the basis upon which the parties 
contracted. 7 
The actual expenses incurred by Young Electric with 
relation to the subject sign amounted to $175.00 for main-
tenance for the year 1973 (R-114) and $3.75 per month for 
property taxes (R-135). The testimony indicated that plain-
tiff was self-insured in relation to property damage (R-116) 
and had a blanket policy of liability coverage on all of its 
signs. Defendant states, and plaintiff agrees, that the 
cost of the liability insurance as it related to the sub-
ject signs could not be great (Defendant's brief, page 7). 
6Mr. Gilbert testified that the actual expense might 
have been much greater or much less than the $50.00 budgeted 
amount (R-96). 
7 In Ray v. Electrical Products Consolidated, supra, 
lessee also attempted to utilize cost allowances rather 
than the actual expenses. 
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The uncontroverted evidence indicates that plaintiff's 
actual out-of-pocket expenses for the signs, as opposed to 
its budgeted or estimated expenses, amounted to $14.58 per 
month for maintenance ($175.00 7 12) and $3.75 per month for 
taxes, making the total monthly expense $18.33. 
In determining the reasonableness of the 75% pro-
vision it is important to remember that the purpose and 
function of this Court is to place the injured party so far 
as is possible in a position no better or no worse than he 
would have occupied had the contract been performed. Young 
Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, supra: Ray v. Electrical Products 
Consolidated, supra. 
The evidence indicated that Young Electric made a 
reasonable effort to mitigate its damages by re-letting the 
signs: further, the Trial Court awarded damages to plaintiff 
only for such time as the plaintiff had not entered into a 
subsequent rental agreement with the subsequent occupant of 
. 8 
the prem1.ses. 
Plaintiff agrees that it is obligated to give de-
fendant credit for the saved expenses which it did not 
incur because the breach by lessee relieved it from further 
performance. Young Electric Sign Company v. Capps, supra. 
In applying this principle, plaintiff's damages would be 
computed by establishing the total unpaid rentals ($99.17 
per month) less the saved monthly expenses ($14.58 maintenance 
8Although the defendant's signs were required to be 
removed, plaintiff was able to use a portion of the sign 
structure and entered into a new contract with a subsequent 
lessee. The first payment thereunder was due in May, 1975 
(R-142). 
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+ $3.75 taxes= $18.33), which results in net damages to 
plaintiff of $80.84 per month ($99.17 - $18.33). Since the 
Trial court awarded liquidated damages to plaintiff in the 
sum of $74.25 per month (Finding No. 11, R-58), the liqui-
dated damages as awarded are actually less than plaintiff's 
actual damages and hence must be reasonable and proper. 
The evidence is undisputed, however, that plaintiff's 
obligation to pay taxes and insurance on the signs continued 
through 1974 to the end of that year (R-92) and, indeed, that 
9 
the taxes were paid additionally through 1975 (R-134). Thus 
it appears that the only "saved expense" occasioned by de-
fendant's breach of contract was the maintenance expense 
which had averaged $14.58 per month. Thus the actual dam-
ages caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach were really 
$84.59 per month ($99.17 - $14.58), some $10.00 more than was 
actually awarded to plaintiff under the liquidated damages 
provision. Plaintiff submits there is ample evidence to sup-
port the Trial Court's finding that the liquidated damages as 
awarded by the Trial Court bore a reasonable relationship to 
the actual damages incurred by plaintiff. In construing this 
precise contract two other courts have similarly concurred. 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, supra; Young Electric Sign 
Company v. Fohrman, supra. Plaintiff submits that the require-
ments of Section 339 were met and that the award of liquidated 
9since defendant refused to allow plaintiff to repo-
ssess the signs plaintiff was forced to maintain insurance and 
pay property taxes on those signs subsequent thereto. There-
fore, defendant cannot now complain that he does not get credit 
for these expenses which normally would be saved but which in 
this instance he forced plaintiff to incur. 
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damages must be sustained by this Court. 
Point V 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER A REASONABLE ATTOR-
NEY'S FEE ON THIS APPEAL. 
The lease agreement upon which plaintiff relies 
provides as follows: 
"In the event this agreement is placed 
by Lessor in the hands of an attorney after 
default for enforcement or collection, Lessee 
will pay a reasonable attorney's fee." (Para-· 
graph 8, Ex. 2-P). 
Since the agreement provides for the award of attorney's 
fees such an award is proper under the laws of this state. 
Holland v. Brown, 15 Ut.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964); Hawkins 
v. Perry, 123 Ut.l6, 253 P.2d 312 (1953). The Trial Court 
found that $500.00 was a reasonable sum to be awarded plain-
tiff for its legal costs to date (Finding No. 12, R-58). 
Plaintiff submits that since it prevailed in the 
Trial Court that if that judgment is affirmed herein, as 
plaintiff insists it must be, it should be allowed to re-
cover from appellant its attorney's fees on this appeal pur-
suant to the terms of the contract. Such an award is not 
only proper, Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, supra, but is 
necessary to allow plaintiff to recover the full benefit of 
its bargain. 
CONCLUSION 
The Findings of Fact are clearly supported by ample 
evidence. Appellant cannot meet his burden of showing clear 
-23·· 
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error on the part of the Trial Court. Defendant refused to 
make his monthly payments under the lease agreement and became 
in material default thereunder. Upon defendant's breach, 
plaintiff had the right to immediately repossess the signs, 
and defendant became indebted not only for the delinquent 
rentals but for 75% of the remaining contract balance. Defen-
dant's breach relieved plaintiff of its duty to further main-
tain the signs. The Trial Court specifically found that the 
liquidated damages provision of the contract was reasonable 
and met the requirements of the Restatement of Contracts, 
Section 339. This precise contract has been upheld by the 
Supreme Courts of Idaho and Nevada and similar liquidated 
damages clauses are recognized throughout the sign industry. 
The mere existence of a security deposit does not relieve 
defendant of his obligations under the contract. Such a 
deposit is given to secure performance, not in lieu thereof. 
Defendant was entitled to the full return of his deposit only 
if he completely performed all of his contractual obligations. 
This defendant failed to do, therefore the deposit could prop-
erly be applied by plaintiff to partially off-set the damages 
caused to it by defendant's breach. 
The Findings of the Trial Court are amply supported 
by the evidence. Plaintiff contends, therefore, that the 
judgment of the Trial Court must be affirmed and that plain-
tiff should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees on this 
appeal pursuant to the terms of the subject contract. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES 
By __ -:;J;-.---=T~h-o_m_a_s-...,B""o_w_e_n ____ _ 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
to Richard w. Campbell, Attorney for Appellant, this day 
of December, 1976. 
J. Thomas Bowen 
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